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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

7 FAMILIAS UNIDAS POR LA
8 JUSTICIA, AFL-CIO, a labor
9 organization;

10 Plaintiff,

11 vs.

12 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
13 OF LABOR, and JULIE SU in her
14 official capacity Acting United States
15 Secretary of Labor,

16 Defendants.

No. 2:24-cv-00637

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

NOTE ON MOTION CALENDAR:
June 7, 2024

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

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I. INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) has recognized that protecting the wages that prevail in a crop activity is critical to carrying out Congress's command that the importation of foreign H-2A workers not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers. In 2022, DOL promulgated a new methodology that it claimed would make it easier to find prevailing wages and thus improve the protections for U.S. workers. In practice, those regulations have had the opposite effect, making it virtually impossible to determine a prevailing wage

1 for any crop activity, and leaving U.S. workers with none of the protections that
2 DOL admits are critical.

3 Washington-State harvest workers currently have no prevailing wage
4 protections. Meanwhile, DOL has continued to admit thousands of foreign workers
5 at hourly wages far below the prevailing piece-rate wages that Washington workers
6 depend upon. The admission of those workers at substandard wages is having a
7 devastating effect on the wages and job opportunities of Washington farmworkers
8 in direct contravention of Congress's mandate. 8 U.S.C. §1188. Accordingly,
9 Plaintiff, Familias Unidas por la Justicia (Familias), an independent union
10 representing its Washington farmworker members, filed this action to challenge the
11 lawfulness of the new prevailing wage rules and DOL's application of these rules
12 to Washington. Here, Familias seeks a preliminary injunction requiring DOL to
13 enforce the 2020-Survey prevailing wages (the last prevailing wage findings in
14 effect before the new methodology eliminated all prevailing wages), until such
15 time as DOL publishes new, lawful prevailing wages for Washington. Although
16 the 2020 prevailing wages do not reflect the wage increases that have occurred in
17 the past four years, enforcement of those wages will at least protect the prevailing
18 piece-rate wage structure that has, for decades, been the mainstay of Washington
19 farmworkers and ensure that employers cannot use foreign workers willing to work
20 for lower hourly rates to undermine that wage structure.
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1 **II. STATUTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

2 **A. The H-2A Program**

3 The H-2A program allows U.S. employers to bring foreign nationals to the
4 United States to fill temporary agricultural jobs where the supply of U.S. workers is
5 insufficient if, and only if, the importation of such workers will not depress the
6 wages and working conditions of domestic farmworkers. Before an employer files a
7 petition for visas, federal law requires DOL to certify that there are not sufficient
8 domestic workers who are willing “to perform the labor or services involved in the
9 petition,” at the terms offered and that **“the employment of [foreign] labor . . . will
10 not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United
11 States similarly employed.”** 8 U.S.C. § 1188(a)(1) (emphasis added).

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14 To fulfill this statutory mandate to prevent adverse effect on the wages of
15 domestic farmworkers, DOL regulations have for decades provided that employers
16 who seek to import foreign H-2A workers must offer and pay the highest of (i) the
17 Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR), a special minimum hourly wage set by DOL,
18 (ii) the prevailing wage rate for the crop activity, (iii) the agreed-upon collective
19 bargaining wage, or (iv) the Federal or State minimum wage. 20 C.F.R. §
20 655.120(a); *see also* 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(l). Because the Washington AEWR is
21 always higher than the minimum wage and there are very few collectively bargained
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1 wages in agriculture, the rule in effect requires the higher of the prevailing wage or
2 the AEW.

3 DOL requires employers to pay the highest of these wages to “ensure[] that
4 domestic [farm]workers receive the greatest potential protection from the adverse
5 effects on their wages and working conditions” caused by the importation of foreign
6 H-2A workers. 75 Fed. Reg. 6884, 6893 (Feb. 12, 2010); *see generally id.* at 6891-
7 93.

9 While the AEW is a minimum hourly wage floor for all H-2A farms in a
10 state, prevailing wages are intended to reflect the most common method of payment
11 (piece rate or hourly) paid to workers in specific crop activities (e.g. harvest of gala
12 apples). DOL has long recognized that when the prevailing wage for a crop activity
13 is higher than the AEW, “domestic workers would be disadvantaged by the use of
14 the AEW instead of the higher alternative.” *Id.* at 6893; *see also* 6895, n.9. And as
15 recently as 2023, DOL reiterated that *the prevailing wage serves “as an important*
16 *protection for workers in crop and agricultural activities that offer piece rate pay or*
17 *higher hourly rates than the AEW.”* 88 Fed. Reg. 12760, 12775 (Feb. 28, 2023)
18 (emphasis added).

21 For over 40 years, DOL has funded State Workforce Agencies (SWAs) to
22 conduct prevailing wage surveys according to a methodology determined by DOL.
23 *See* 87 Fed. Reg. at 61679, 61689 (Oct. 12, 2022); 84 Fed. Reg. at 36171, 36179

1 (July 26, 2019); Fuentes Decl. Ex. 30. Pursuant to DOL’s rules, SWAs send survey
2 questionnaires to all employers and use the responses to make prevailing wage rate
3 (PWR) findings for different crop activities. *Id.* Once PWR findings have been
4 made, they are submitted to DOL, which reviews the findings and, if approved,
5 publishes them on DOL’s Agricultural Online Wage Library (AOWL). *Id.* H-2A
6 employers must offer and pay the published prevailing rate as a condition of
7 receiving certification for H-2A visas. 655 C.F.R. § 655.122(c)&(l).
8

9 **B. Prevailing Wage Determinations in Washington State Prior to the**
10 **Challenged Regulations**

11 The Washington State Employment Security Department (ESD) is the SWA
12 for Washington. ESD began conducting prevailing wage surveys shortly after
13 Washington employers first began importing H-2A workers in the mid-2000s. From
14 2006-2018, ESD’s prevailing wage surveys determined, consistent with the
15 industry’s decades-old practice, that piece-rate wages were the prevailing wages for
16 the harvest of apples, cherries and pears. *See* DOL, AOWL,
17 <https://www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/foreign-labor/wages/agriculture> (Linville Decl.
18 Ex. A).
19

20 In the 2019 Survey, the number of prevailing piece-rate findings made by ESD
21 for fruit harvest work fell from 21 crops to 6. When DOL published those findings
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1 as the rates applicable to the 2021 season,¹ farmworkers sued alleging that the
2 precipitous drop in prevailing piece rate findings was the result of manipulation of
3 survey responses by the agricultural industry, and methodological missteps by ESD
4 and DOL. *Torres Hernandez v. USDOL, et al.*, No. 1:20-cv-03241-SMJ (E.D.
5 Wash., filed December 17, 2020). The farmworker plaintiffs obtained a preliminary
6 injunction requiring DOL to continue to enforce the prevailing wages derived from
7 the 2018 employer wage survey during the 2021 season and until such time as DOL
8 published a new, non-arbitrary prevailing wage survey. *Torres Hernandez v.*
9 *Stewart*, No. 1:20-CV-03241-SMJ, 2021 WL 6274440, at *12 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 1,
10 2021).
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12
13 The 2020 employer wage survey conducted by ESD reported prevailing piece-
14 rate findings applicable to 10 harvest crops, but importantly included three “general”
15 harvest wages (for apple, cherry, and berry) covering every variety without a specific
16 prevailing wage, and the findings reflected increases in the prevailing piece rates
17 since 2018. Woerner Decl. at 2-3. As a result, the parties jointly asked the court to
18 modify the injunction to allow DOL to proceed with publication of the 2020
19

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21 _____
22 ¹ Because ESD conducts surveys late in the year, preliminary findings are generally released in the
23 spring or summer of the following year. DOL often does not publish the prevailing wages until the
fall of that year or even the winter of the next year. Thus, the survey conducted in late 2019 was
not published until December 2020, and it applied to the 2021 season.

1 prevailing wage findings. Fuentes Decl. Ex. 34 (Order Granting Sealed [now
2 unsealed] Joint Motion for Entry of Modified Order, *Torres Hernandez v. Walsh*,
3 No. 1:20-cv-3241-SMJ (Dec. 7, 2021)). DOL published the prevailing wages
4 derived from the 2020 employer wage survey on January 24, 2022, Linville Decl.
5 Ex. A, and, pursuant to the agreed modified injunction, those prevailing wages were
6 applicable to harvest work performed after that date.
7

8 **C. The Challenged 2022 Prevailing Wage Methodology**

9 In 2019, DOL issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to amend its H-2A
10 regulations, including its rules applicable to the prevailing-wage-finding process. 84
11 Fed. Reg. 36168, 36184-36189 (July 26, 2019). The NPRM noted that:

12 [C]oncerns about wage depression from the importation of foreign
13 workers [under the H-2A visa program] are particularly acute because
14 access to an unlimited number of foreign workers in a particular labor
15 market and crop activity or agricultural activity could cause the
16 prevailing wage of workers in the United States similarly employed to
stagnate.


17 *Id.* at 36180. DOL was also concerned that the existing methodology “incentivized
18 employers not to respond to a survey” because employers could prevent a prevailing
19 wage finding from being made by not responding. *Id.* at 36187. H-2A employers
20 prefer no prevailing wage finding because without one, they are free to import and
21 pay foreign workers at the hourly AEWR rather than at the significantly higher piece
22 rates that are typically found to be prevailing. DOL made clear that the proposed
23 changes were designed “to encourage a greater number of reliable prevailing wage

1 results,” *id.* at 36185, noting that the existing methodology “often result in ‘no
2 finding’ from a prevailing wage survey [which is] both **a waste of government**
3 **resources and fail[s] to meet the goal of producing reliable and accurate**
4 **prevailing wage rates,”** *id.* at 36187 (emphasis added). DOL stated that it intended
5 the proposed rule changes to allow it to:
6

7 [W]ork with the States through their annual grant plans to focus
8 prevailing wage surveys on those crop[s] . . . where prevailing wage
9 surveys **are most useful to protect the wages of U.S. workers,**
10 **including for activities for which employers commonly pay based**
11 **on a piece rate[.]**

12 *Id.* at 36180 (emphasis added).

13 DOL published the final H-2A Rule on October 12, 2022, with an effective
14 date of November 14, 2022. 87 Fed. Reg. 61660 (Oct. 12, 2022). Contrary to DOL’s
15 mandate and the agency’s stated goal of encouraging a greater number of prevailing
16 wage findings, the newly adopted rule changes have had the opposite effect: **DOL**
17 **has published no prevailing wage findings for Washington State since these**
18 **regulations went into effect.** ESD applied the new methodology to its 2021 survey
19 results but never submitted the findings to DOL. Schmitt Decl. ¶¶3-4. Based on its
20 2022 survey, ESD reported only 4 harvest prevailing-wage findings (all piece-rates,
21 one “general” harvest wage for pear) down from 9 found in 2020 (including three
22 “general” harvest wages: apple, cherry, berry) using the old methodology:
23



Pashkowski Decl. ¶20. Effective January 2023, DOL relied on its new regulations to deem all of the 2020 prevailing wage rates no longer valid, Fuentes Decl. Ex. 27 ¶7, and, although ESD submitted the findings from its 2022 survey to DOL in 2023, DOL has never published those prevailing wages, Linville Decl. Ex. A. As a result, **Washington agricultural workers have no prevailing wage protections. Nevertheless, DOL has continued to approve H-2A applications throughout that period, including applications with requests for 23,405 H-2A workers for the 2024 season.** Pashkowski Decl. ¶4.

This suit challenges DOL’s failure to protect Washington prevailing wages, which has allowed H-2A workers to adversely affect the wages and working

1 conditions of Washington farmworkers. Three actions in particular are challenged in
2 this motion and referred to by Familias as “One-Year Rule,” the “25% Rule,” and
3 the “Population Estimate Methodology.”

4
5 **1. One-Year Rule -- 20 C.F.R. §655.120(c)(2)**

6 The “One-Year Rule” requires that prevailing wage findings automatically
7 expire one year after initial publication in order to ensure that prevailing wages are
8 based on “the most recent data.” 20 C.F.R. §655.120(c)(2); 87 Fed. Reg. at 61701.
9 Implicit in the adoption of this Rule was the notion that DOL would publish new
10 prevailing wages each year. However, since the regulation was adopted, DOL has
11 made clear through its inaction on Washington-State wage findings that it has no
12 such intention. As applied, DOL interprets the “One-Year Rule” to mean that, unless
13 DOL chooses to make a new finding, DOL will enforce no prevailing wage for a
14 crop activity and instead allow employers to import H-2A workers to perform that
15 work at the far lower hourly AEWR. *See* 20 C.F.R. 655.120(a)(2) (PWR required
16 only if one has been approved).
17

18 Because of this interpretation, DOL has enforced no prevailing wage rates in
19 Washington since January 2023. *See* Linville Decl. Ex. A; Fuentes Decl. Ex. 29 at
20 881. Even though ESD reported 2022 prevailing wages for four crop activities in
21 August 2023, Fuentes Decl. Ex. 26 at 667, DOL has not taken action on those
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1 findings, neither approving them for publication nor sending them back to ESD for
2 reconsideration, *id.*; Linville Decl. Ex. A.

3 **2. 25% Rule -- 20 C.F.R. § 655.120(c)(1)(ix)**

4 The 25% Rule requires that no employer responding to the survey may
5 account for more than 25% of the workers paid at the prevailing method of payment.

6 20 C.F.R. § 655.120(c)(1)(ix). This provision was added “to ensure prevailing wages
7 are as reliable as possible.” 87 Fed. Reg. at 61699. Rather than simply removing the
8 large employer’s data from the survey and calculate the prevailing wage based on
9 the remaining survey responses, ESD has interpreted the 25% Rule as *prohibiting a*
10 *prevailing wage finding from being made* if one of the respondents accounts for more
11 than 25% of the workers paid at the prevailing method of payment. Fuentes Decl.
12 Ex. 1 at 24. DOL has not corrected that statistically suspect and unlawful view
13 despite ample opportunity to do so. *See* Fuentes Decl. Ex. 2 at 37; Ex. 29 at 878-79;
14 Ex. 1 at 24. Applying its interpretation to its 2022 survey results, ESD threw out all
15 prevailing wage data for harvest work in at least 15 major Washington fruit varieties
16 or variety groups:

- 17 • General apple
- 18 • Red Delicious apple
- 19 • Honeycrisp apple
- 20 • Granny Smith apple

- 1 • Golden Delicious apple
- 2 • Gala apple
- 3 • Fuji apple
- 4 • Cripps Pink (“Pink Lady”) apple
- 5 • Cosmic Crisp apple
- 6 • Ambrosia apple
- 7 • General cherry
- 8 • Red cherry
- 9 • Sweetheart cherry
- 10 • Yellow cherry
- 11 • Dark-sweet cherry

12 Fuentes Decl. Ex. 1 at 30.

13 **3. Population Estimate Methodology**

14 The new rules require a SWA to estimate whether there are at least 30 workers
15 and 5 employers in a crop activity. 20 C.F.R. §655.120(c)(1)(vii) and (viii). The
16 preamble to the Rule states that the population estimates may be made using readily
17 available data such as “UI databases, open and closed job orders, State labor market
18 information, and information provided by State agricultural extension offices. . .” 87
19 Fed. Reg. at 61694. Nevertheless, ESD has chosen to rely exclusively on a complex
20 computation, including a methodology known as “capture-recapture,” to estimate
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1 the population of employers and workers in a crop activity.² *Zirkle v. USDOL*, 442
2 F. Supp. 3d at 1373. This capture-recapture methodology is commonly used to
3 estimate wildlife populations, such as the number of fish in a lake.³ It relies upon an
4 analysis of previous years’ surveys as compared to the current year and on “raking
5 algorithms” to produce estimates of the percentage of the total population
6 represented by each employer responding to the survey. *Id.* The capture-recapture
7 methodology requires a minimum number of responses both in prior years and the
8 present year in order to be implemented, and further requires that those responses
9 come from a certain ratio of “small, medium, and large” employers, as defined by
10 ESD. *See* Schmitt Decl. Ex. E.
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13 The complex data requirements necessary to implement ESD’s methodology
14 are often missing for a particular crop activity, with the result that ESD claims it
15 cannot even undertake the prevailing-wage-finding process because it cannot
16 estimate how many employers and/or workers there are in that crop activity. As a
17 result of its reliance on the capture-recapture methodology, ESD *refused to even*
18 *attempt to make prevailing wage findings* for dozens of crop activities covered by
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21 ² ESD developed this methodology to estimate the *total* worker population in a crop activity as
22 was required by the *pre-2022 regulatory scheme*. *See* Fuentes Decl. Ex. 21; Ex. 30 at 886; Ex. 11.

23 ³ *See* Fishbio, One Fish, Two Fish – Using Mark-Recapture to Estimate Population Size (Aug. 19,
2020), <https://fishbio.com/using-mark-recapture-estimate-population-size/>.

1 the 2022 survey including Braeburn, Jonagold, and Jazz apples; Rainier, Lapin, and
2 Skeena cherries; Bosc, D’Anjou, and Asian pears; and all berries (blueberries,
3 strawberries, raspberries, and blackberries). Fuentes Decl. Ex. 1 at 31-33.

4 DOL has endorsed both ESD’s decision to rely on the capture-recapture
5 methodology to estimate whether there are 5 employers and 30 workers in a crop
6 activity and its refusal to make findings where the methodology cannot be applied.⁴


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8 **D. The Challenged Regulations Are Causing Irreparable Injury to**
9 **Washington Workers**

10 DOL’s failure to protect the wages prevailing in Washington harvest work is
11 having and will continue to have devastating effects on Washington State
12 farmworkers in the form of wage depression and loss of employment.

13 Piece rates have been and continue to be far and away the most common
14 method of payment in the harvest of Washington’s fruit crops, and those prevailing
15 piece rates allow Washington’s farmworkers to earn far more than the hourly
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18 _____
19 ⁴ DOL understands the intricacies of ESD’s methodology from litigation under the old rules, *see*
20 *Zirkle v. U.S.DOL*, 442 F. Supp. 3d at 1380-81, and ESD had a conference call with DOL regarding
21 how to implement the new regulations in March 2023, in which ESD informed DOL it was using
22 its population estimate methodology and asked questions about where in the process to use it,
23 Fuentes Decl. Ex. 29 at 878-79. DOL later wrote an email approving of the use of population
estimates in certain parts of the analysis under the new rules and did not repudiate ESD’s
methodology. *Id.* at 875-76.

1 AEW. In 2022, an average 73% of employers reported to ESD that they paid by
 2 the piece across fruit harvests. Pashkowski Decl. ¶8. Annual surveys of fruit-harvest
 3 workers conducted by ESD since 2016 have reported consistently that 80% or more
 4 of the workers in each harvest activity (with an exception for one particularly
 5 delicate variety of apples) were paid by the piece. Woerner Decl. ¶¶8-9; Fuentes
 6 Decl. Ex. 33 at 924-25; Ex. 33 at 912. A chart of the 2022 worker survey findings—
 7 prepared by ESD—displays in orange the piece-rate wage responses from domestic
 8 farmworkers:
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21 Fuentes Decl. Ex. 1 at 20.

22 Worker declarants in this case from around the state, including the President
 23 of Familias Unidas, report that they almost always earn money by the piece in

1 harvest work, consistent with industry practice. Ramirez Decl. ¶12; Dominguez
2 Decl. ¶21. Alex Galarza, the Northwest Justice Project’s Outreach Coordinator for
3 more than 16 years confirms that through his contact with hundreds, if not thousands,
4 of workers a year, he knows that the vast majority of workers harvest Washington’s
5 fruit crops by the piece. Galarza Decl. ¶25. Piece rates prevail in berry harvesting
6 work, as well. Ramirez Decl. ¶12.

8 Piece-rate pay systems allow Washington farmworkers to earn far more than
9 the hourly AEWR. Piece rates allow workers to increase their earnings based on their
10 speed and ability; the more skilled a worker is, the more money the worker can make;
11 hourly wages deprive workers of that opportunity. Martin Decl. Ex. A at 6; Salas
12 Decl. ¶¶8-19; Ruiz Decl. ¶¶8-13; 16-19, 21-24; Linares Decl. ¶¶13-14. Familias
13 members report earning between \$20-40 per hour harvesting different varieties of
14 cherries, apples, and blueberries at piece-rate wages. Dominguez Decl. ¶¶9-10; Salas
15 Decl. ¶¶20, 22; Ruiz Decl. ¶¶21, 23; Linares Decl. ¶¶7-11; Juarez Decl. ¶8; Ramirez
16 Decl. ¶13 (Familias members earn upwards of \$200 or \$300 per day, or \$25-37 per
17 hour, harvesting blueberries in very good conditions). In 2023, even delicate
18 varieties were paid at piece rates that allowed workers to earn wages far in excess of
19 the AEWR. Salas Decl. ¶18; Ruiz Decl. ¶19 (earning \$28-33/hour picking delicate
20 Sugarbee apples at a piece rate). Those high earnings are consistent with the theory
21 behind piece rates which holds that, to be effective as ensuring high productivity,
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1 they must be set to yield earnings 10-40% higher than the applicable minimum
2 hourly wage. Martin Decl. Ex A at 6; *see* Ramirez Decl. ¶¶13-16.

3 The agricultural industry agrees the piece-rate system gives workers a chance
4 to make more money, estimating that workers earn \$250 to \$300 per day (about
5 \$31.00 - \$37.50 an hour) during the cherry harvest.⁵ Tellingly, the CEO of the
6 Washington Farm Labor Association (WAFLA), boasted in an email, after
7 pressuring ESD to remove piece-rate findings, “[I]n case you didn’t hear . . . [ESD]
8 removed all piece rates for apples for growers that utilize the H-2A program. . . This
9 is a huge win and *saved the apple industry millions*. Really glad we could help.”
10 Fuentes Decl. Ex. 12 at 387 (emphasis added).

11 Finally, DOL’s own National Agricultural Worker Survey data shows that
12 between 2011 and 2020, “at least 70% of the piece rate harvest workers in the
13 Northwestern Region [which includes Washington] had hourly earnings that were
14 higher than the [AEWR],” and those workers earned an average of 41% more than
15 workers who were paid by the hour over that same period. Rutledge Decl. Ex. A at
16 7-8.

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21 ⁵Testimony in Washinton State Senate Agriculture, Water, Trade & Economic Development
22 Committee, Feb. 14, 2017, available at: [https://www.tvw.org/watch/?clientID=9375922947
23 &eventID=2017021224&eventID=2017021224&startStreamAt=2068&stopStreamAt=2293&autoStartStream=true](https://www.tvw.org/watch/?clientID=9375922947&eventID=2017021224&eventID=2017021224&startStreamAt=2068&stopStreamAt=2293&autoStartStream=true) (starting approximately 34:00; \$250-\$300 referenced at 37:40).

1 Washington farmworkers rely on the high earnings generated by piece rate
2 pay to tide their families over the winter months when agricultural work is scarce.
3 Salas Decl. ¶23; Dominguez Decl. ¶¶16-23; Linares Decl. ¶ 13; Ramirez Decl. ¶¶15-
4 16; *see* Fuentes Decl. Ex. 14 at 474 (farmworker wages among lowest in country);
5 Ex. 25 at 660 (farmworker pay far lower than usually reported because of seasonal
6 nature of work).
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8 DOL's failure to protect the high earnings produced by the piece rate pay
9 systems prevailing in Washington harvest work and, instead, allow H-2A employers
10 to import foreign workers at lower hourly rates will inevitably lead to wage
11 depression. DOL has acknowledged this:
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13 Economic theory holds that, other things being constant, any increase
14 in the supply of labor available in a labor market segment would result
15 in a decrease in the equilibrium wage. This theory-based observation of
16 the effect of increased labor supply is the basis for the concern that
17 currently employed, or incumbent farm workers would be adversely
18 affected by lowered wages as a result of the influx of temporary foreign
19 farm workers. . . .

20 In cases in which the AEWL is not higher than the prevailing
21 wage . . . incumbent domestic workers would be disadvantaged by the
22 use of the AEWL instead of the higher [prevailing wage].
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75 Fed Reg at 6892-6893.

Not only does an influx of foreign workers at wages below those prevailing
in the area have a depressive effect on the wages of U.S. workers, it also deprives
U.S. workers of needed job opportunities. U.S. workers relying on the earnings they

1 receive while working by the piece cannot afford to take harvest jobs that pay by the
2 hour; to do so would be to risk their families' survival. *See* Juarez Decl. ¶9; Ramirez
3 Decl. ¶¶15-16. DOL has recognized that fact as well. *See* 20 C.F.R. §655.0(a)(2)
4 (“U.S. workers cannot be expected to accept employment under conditions below
5 the established minimum levels.”). Thus, each time DOL allows an employer to hire
6 foreign workers to perform harvest work at hourly rates, it is effectively taking jobs
7 away from Washington workers.

9 What is more, the below-market hourly wages will affect the results of
10 prevailing wage surveys in future years, causing further harm by creating a
11 downward wage cycle.

12 III. ARGUMENT

13 A. Legal Standard for Preliminary Injunctions

14 A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction “must meet one of two variants
15 of the same standard.” *Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Pena*, 865 F.3d 1211, 1217
16 (9th Cir. 2017). Under the original “*Winter*” standard, plaintiffs must establish that
17 they are (1) “likely to succeed on the merits”; (2) “likely to suffer irreparable harm
18 in the absence of preliminary relief”; (3) that “the balance of equities tips in [its]
19 favor”; and (4) that “an injunction is in the public interest.” *Disney Enterprises, Inc.*
20 *v. VidAngel, Inc.*, 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting
21 *Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). When
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1 the government is a party, the last two factors—the balance of equities and the public
2 interest—merge. *E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump*, 950 F.3d 1242, 1271 (9th
3 Cir. 2020). Alternatively, under the “sliding scale” variant of the *Winter* standard,
4 the first two elements are “balanced[] so that a stronger showing of one element may
5 offset a weaker showing of another.” *Hernandez v. Sessions*, 872 F.3d 976, 990 (9th
6 Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted). Under that standard, preliminary relief is
7 appropriate when a plaintiff raises “serious questions going to the merits—a lesser
8 showing than likelihood of success on the merits,” the “balance of hardships tips
9 sharply in the plaintiff’s favor.” *Alliance for the Wild Rockies*, 865 F.3d at 1217
10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
11

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13 **B. Familias is likely to prevail in demonstrating that the “Prevailing Wage**
14 **Expiration” Rule, the “25% Rule,” and the “Population Estimate**
15 **Methodology” are Arbitrary, Capricious, and Contrary to Law under the**
16 **APA**

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18 **1. APA Standard**

19 The APA directs courts to “hold unlawful and set aside” agency action that is
20 “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
21 law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). “[A]n agency rule [is] arbitrary and capricious if the
22 agency has . . . entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered
23 an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency,
or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product
of agency expertise.” *Alaska Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Centers for Medicare*

1 & *Medicaid Servs.*, 424 F.3d 931, 938 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting *Motor Vehicle Mfrs.*
2 *Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). The
3 crux of this test is whether the agency has “engaged in reasoned decisionmaking.”
4 *Judulang v. Holder*, 565 U.S. 42, 53 (2011). To satisfy the test, an agency must
5 “cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner.” *Motor*
6 *Vehicle Mfrs.*, 463 U.S. at 48.

8 Agency action is “not in accordance with law” if it violates a statutory or
9 regulatory requirement. In evaluating this type of challenge:

10 [A] reviewing court must first determine if the regulation is consistent
11 with the language of the statute. . . . In ascertaining the plain meaning
12 of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at
issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.

13 *K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.*, 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (internal quotations
14 omitted). Agencies may not adopt rules that “defeat the purpose” of the underlying
15 statute. *Batterton v. Francis*, 432 U.S. 416, 428 (1977). “Constructions that are
16 contrary to clear Congressional intent or frustrate the policy that Congress sought to
17 implement must be rejected.” *Earth Island Inst. v. Hogarth*, 494 F.3d 757, 765 (9th
18 Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). *Familias* is likely to succeed on its challenges under
19 both APA standards.
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1 **2. The “One-Year Rule” is Arbitrary and Capricious and Contrary**
2 **to Law If New Prevailing Wages Are Not Published Each Year**

3 DOL’s decision to enforce the new “one-year expiration” rule, 20 C.F.R. §
4 655.120(c)(2), without adopting new prevailing wages to replace the expired wages,
5 is both arbitrary and contrary to law. DOL’s stated reason for adopting the Rule was
6 that it would help the department base prevailing wages on “the most recent data,”
7 87 Fed. Reg. 61660, 61701 (Oct. 12, 2022), clearly implying that it would publish
8 prevailing wages each year. But that is not what DOL is doing.⁶ Instead, it is
9 applying the Rule to eliminate prevailing wage protections altogether. The
10 Farmworkers agree that enforcing prevailing wages based on “the most recent data”
11 is an appropriate goal, but if the most recent data happens to be more than a year old,
12 it still offers significant protections for U.S. workers. While it may not reflect
13 *increases* in the prevailing wage level,⁷ even year-old data ensures that the prevailing
14 method of payment (overwhelmingly piece rates in harvest work) is protected and
15 that foreign workers do not undercut that method of payment by being imported at
16 the hourly AEW. DOL offers no explanation as to why it considers *no* prevailing
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20 ⁶ ESD has implored DOL to publish its 2022 wage findings for nine months to no avail. Fuentes
21 Decl. Ex. 26.

22 ⁷ That Washington farmworker wage rates tend to go up over time is well established. *See*
23 Pashkowski Decl. ¶¶15-19; Woerner Decl. at 2-3 (prevailing wages increase over time); Fuentes
Decl. Ex. 32.

1 wage preferable to allowing a prevailing wage to remain on the books until such
2 time as a new prevailing wage finding has been published. Its refusal to do so cannot
3 be squared with its stated rulemaking goal of “mak[ing] prevailing wage findings
4 available where, *the prevailing wage rate would be higher than the AEW*.”⁸ 87
5 Fed. Reg. 61660, 61701 (Oct. 12, 2022) (emphasis added).
6

7 DOL’s application of the One-Year Rule is also contrary to law because it
8 represents a wholesale abandonment of DOL’s duty to protect U.S. workers. As
9 noted above, DOL has long recognized that the failure to protect prevailing wages
10 allows the very wage depression that Congress prohibited when it adopted 8 U.S.C.
11 §1188. As a result of the One-Year Rule, DOL has now approved at least 214 H-2A
12 visa applications for Washington State requesting more than 23,000 foreign workers
13 in 2024, Pashkowski Decl. ¶4, all without any prevailing wage protections for
14 Washington farmworkers.
15

16 In order to ensure that Congress’s statutory mandate that the importation of
17 foreign workers not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of U.S.
18 workers is carried out, this Court should preliminarily enjoin the “One-Year Rule”
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20
21 ⁸ DOL stated in the rule preamble that the One-Year Rule was “generally consistent with DOL’s
22 current practice” at the time of rulemaking. 87 Fed. Reg. 61660, 61701 (Oct. 12, 2022). As to
23 Washington, however, DOL has consistently left prevailing wages in effect for more than a year.
Besso Decl. ¶¶6-8; Linville Decl. ¶¶16-19.

1 and reinstate the 2020 prevailing wages published on January 24, 2022 (which are
2 the prevailing wages based on the “most recent data”) until judgment is entered in
3 this case.

4 **3. DOL’s Approval of ESD’s Application of the 25% Rule is**
5 **Arbitrary and Capricious and Contrary to Law**

6 Plaintiffs are also likely to succeed on their claim that DOL’s approval of
7 ESD’s interpretation of the 25% Rule is arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law.
8 The Department proposed the 25% rule in 2019 with the stated goal of ensuring that
9 a prevailing wage finding “is not unduly impacted by the wages of a single dominant
10 employer.” 84 Fed. Reg. 36168, 36187 (July 26, 2019). DOL emphasized that the
11 25% rule was “consistent with the Department’s aim of requiring that the wages
12 reported from a prevailing wage survey are sufficiently representative, and the wages
13 of a single employer do not drive the wage result.” *Id.* at 36188. Even assuming that
14 the presence of data from a large employer somehow makes survey responses
15 unrepresentative, it is irrational to then allow ESD to throw out the rest of the survey
16 responses and refuse to make any prevailing wage finding for that crop activity. It
17 would be far more consistent with DOL’s goal of increasing the number of prevailing
18 wage findings and its duty to protect prevailing wages to simply remove the large
19 employer’s data from the sample. If there are sufficient other responses to meet the
20 minimum requirements (5 employers/30 workers), a prevailing wage could then be
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1 calculated without being “unduly impacted by the wages of a single dominant
2 employer.”

3 That could have been done with at least 12 of the major crop activities in
4 which the presence of one large employer resulted in no prevailing wage finding.
5 For example, the 2022 survey data for “general cherry harvest”—one of the 15
6 harvest surveys that failed the 25% Rule—included responses from 103 agricultural
7 employers with 81% (83 out of 103) responding they paid a piece-rate wage for
8 general cherry harvest. Pashkowski Decl. ¶9. ESD determined that a piece-rate of 27
9 cents a pound was the prevailing wage rate based on wage data from the 32⁹ cherry
10
11

12
13 ⁹ The 32 growers who paid piece rates without hourly guarantees establish the majority method of
14 payment. The other 51 growers paid piece rates with hourly guarantees, which DOL treats as a
15 different method of payment. The complaint also challenges ESD’s fracturing of piece-rate wages
16 that results in a watering down of 83 to 32 growers, Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶113-133, but that claim is not
17 addressed in this motion. Suffice it to say that the 25% Rule is even more likely to eliminate
18 prevailing wage findings where piece-rates are fractured into tiny categories. Steinbaum Decl. Ex.
19 A at 7-8. For example, for the 2022 survey, the 25% Rule caused a no-finding for three of
20 Washington’s top 5 apple varieties (Fuji, Granny Smith, and Red Delicious) despite the vast
21 majority of growers reporting piece-rate wages. Pashkowski Decl. ¶¶11-13. There, ESD found that
22 a piece rate (by the bin) was the most common method of pay, but that piece rate was reported by
23 *a single grower who said that they were “not sure” of the size of their own apple bins.* Every other
grower answering any apple harvest survey in 2022 knew the size of its bins and answered that
they were a standard size. *Id.* at ¶11 n.1. Because this grower was the only one to report a bin size

1 growers who paid by the piece (the majority method of payment). However, ESD
2 threw out all of the wage data and refused to certify 27 cents a pound as the
3 prevailing wage rate because one employer, who paid 25 cents a pound, employed
4 **25.5%**—283 of the 1,108—of the reported workers. *Id.* Had ESD simply removed
5 that one grower from the data set and used the wage data of the 31 remaining cherry
6 growers who paid by the piece, the 25% Rule would not have been violated (the
7 largest grower would have employed only 18% of the reported workers) and a
8 prevailing piece rate wage could have been reported. *Id.*

9
10 The same result occurred in the “general apple harvest” survey where 133
11 growers responded to the survey, 92 of whom responded they paid a piece rate wage.
12 *Id.* ¶10. ESD determined the majority method of pay was a piece rate of \$29.82 a
13 bin but threw out all the data because the grower who employed the most workers
14 in this pay category—who paid \$30/bin—employed more than 25% of the reported
15 workers. *Id.* If ESD simply eliminated that one grower, the 25% rule would not have
16 applied, and the data from the remaining 42 employers paying by the majority pay
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21 of “not sure,” the calculation was guaranteed to fail the 25% Rule, as the lone employer respondent
22 always employs 100% of the reported workers. *Id.*¹⁰ The Complaint also outlines that ESD’s use
23 of estimated populations later in the prevailing-wage-finding process is contrary to law. Dkt. No.
1 ¶¶ 83-87. This claim is not addressed in this motion.

1 unit could have been calculated and a prevailing piece-rate wage reported to DOL.

2 *Id.*

3 Had DOL required ESD to use a common-sense interpretation of the rule for
4 these two surveys, rather than accepting ESD’s interpretation, **all cherry and apple**
5 **crops would be covered by a piece-rate prevailing wage**—a result that reflects the
6 reality of Washington’s pay structure for fruit harvests and protects the wages of
7 domestic workers.

9 DOL’s acceptance of ESD’s decision to “throw the baby out with the bath
10 water,” rather than insist on the far more commonsense reading of the 25% Rule, is
11 the essence of arbitrary agency action, particularly so because eliminating the
12 dominant employer’s data and calculating the prevailing wage from the remaining
13 data is consistent with DOL’s stated goal of obtaining “a greater number of reliable
14 prevailing wage results,” 84 Fed Reg. at 36185, while throwing out all of the data
15 and failing to make any finding at all because of the presence of one dominant
16 employer is directly contrary to DOL’s stated goal in adopting the new methodology.
17 *See* Steinbaum at 9 (“throwing away the data . . . when one employer predominates
18 in the collected data sample, **defeats the purpose of the regulation**”). As noted by
19 Familias’s expert, there are also other, more sophisticated statistical methods of
20 compensating for the removal of certain survey respondents in a data set. *Id.*

1 Even apart from the irrationality of throwing out all the data because of the
2 presence of one large employer, the underlying assumption that the presence of a
3 large employer renders the survey data unrepresentative is arbitrary. The new
4 methodology requires ESD to send surveys to the entire population of employers in
5 a given crop activity or to a random sample of such employers. 20 C.F.R. §
6 655.120(c)(1)(iv). The methodology then makes the fundamental assumption that if
7 the survey is distributed by one of those means and the required minimum number
8 of voluntary responses are received (at least 5 employers employing at least 30
9 workers), the responses will necessarily constitute a representative sample of the
10 population. Given that assumption, there is no reason to believe that, just because
11 one employer represents 25% or more of the workers reported to have been paid by
12 the majority unit of pay, the sample is no longer representative. Indeed, it may well
13 be that large employers are typical in that crop activity and that responses showing
14 25% or more of workers being employed by a large employer is a statistically
15 accurate reflection of the population. DOL fails to provide any explanation for its
16 assumption that the presence of a large employer among the survey responses makes
17 the responses unrepresentative.
18
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21 DOL's statement that it doesn't want a prevailing wage finding that is "unduly
22 impacted by the wages of a single dominant employer" is similarly unexplained. *See*
23 *Bldg. & Const. Trades Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Martin*, 961 F.2d 269, 277 (D.C. Cir.

1 1992) (holding construction prevailing wage rule arbitrary and capricious for lack of
2 sufficient explanation). Apparently, DOL thinks that large employers pay differently
3 from small- and medium-sized employers. But it offers no evidence to support that
4 assumption, and the assumption is clearly belied by the 2022 survey data gathered
5 by ESD. The 25% rule caused no-findings for harvests of dark Sweet cherries, red
6 cherries, Sweetheart cherries, and Cripps Pink apples, Fuentes Decl. Ex. 1 at 30,
7 even though in every situation, the top employer was paying a piece-rate within the
8 range of piece rates paid by other employers in that wage category, Fuentes Decl.
9 Ex. 6 at 218; 226; 234; 130. Because large employers do not tend to pay differently
10 from small employers, there is no reason to throw out a prevailing wage finding
11 simply because one responding employer represents 25% of the reported workers.
12

13
14 Finally, DOL irrationally states that it came up with the 25% rule by
15 borrowing it from the anti-trust “safety zone” standard used by the Department of
16 Justice to define when communications between employers regarding wages will be
17 viewed as evidence of price-fixing. *See* 84 Fed. Reg. at 36187-88 & n.52. DOL fails
18 to explain how such a rule is relevant to a government wage survey designed to find
19 out how the majority of workers are paid (not how often employers talk to each other
20 about wages, much less what the anti-competitive effects of such discussions may
21 be). *See* Steinbaum Decl. Ex. A at 6 (use of rule in context of government surveys
22 “non-sensical”). It is also worth noting that DOJ and the FTC abandoned the 25%
23

1 safe harbor in 2023, calling it outdated. *See id.* at 2-3. Thus, the only theoretical
2 support DOL offers for the 25% rule turns out to be obsolete as well as inapplicable
3 to wage surveys.

4 DOL's decision to adopt the 25% Rule and to accept ESD's view that the Rule
5 requires throwing out all survey results where a large employer is among the
6 respondents is not only arbitrary and capricious, it is also contrary to law. Like the
7 "One Year Rule," DOL's actions with respect to the 25% Rule necessarily result in
8 fewer, rather than more prevailing wage findings, thereby leaving farmworkers'
9 prevailing wages (including the prevailing piece-rate method of pay) unprotected
10 from the adverse effects of foreign workers, in direct violation of the congressional
11 mandate. Familias requests that this Court preliminarily enjoin DOL from accepting
12 ESD's interpretation of the 25% Rule.

13
14
15 **4. DOL's Implementation of Its Rules by Allowing ESD to Use a**
16 **Complex Population Estimate Methodology Designed for the**
17 **Superseded Regulations, is Arbitrary, Capricious, and Contrary to**
18 **Law**

19 The Farmworkers are likely to succeed on their claim that DOL's decision to
20 permit ESD to use an unnecessary population estimate methodology to make the
21 estimates required by 20 C.F.R. § 655.120(c)(1)(vii) and (viii), is arbitrary,
22 capricious, and contrary to law.

1 Rather than requiring precise population estimates, the current rules simply
2 require ESD to estimate whether a crop activity has more than 30 workers and 5
3 employers. *Id.* ESD’s population estimate methodology, involving layers of
4 statistical analysis, is not remotely necessary to make such a simple estimate. It is
5 self-evident that harvest of major crops involves more than 5 employers and 30
6 workers and, even with less common crop varieties, ESD can rely on the number of
7 workers reported by employers in their survey responses, the number of employers
8 filing H-2A applications for the crop and the number of workers those applications
9 seek, the number of workers responding to ESD’s own worker wage survey, or calls
10 to agricultural extension offices to determine that there are more than 5 employers
11 and more than 30 workers harvesting a crop. It defies logic to say that ESD needs
12 complex algorithms to tell whether there are 5 employers in a particular cherry crop,
13 when more than 5 employers have told ESD on its own wage survey that their
14 workers pick that crop.

17 Because the complex data needed to perform the capture/recapture
18 calculations are missing for many crop activities, ESD’s use of the methodology
19 causes it to declare from the beginning that it cannot even attempt the steps in DOL’s
20 prevailing-wage-finding process, much less make a finding, for a host of crops,
21 including common varieties of apples, cherries, pears, and berries. Fuentes Decl. Ex.
22 1 at 31-33; Schmitt Decl. Ex. E. Thus, the methodology is not only unnecessary, but
23

1 its stringent requirements actively frustrate DOL’s goal of increasing the number of
2 prevailing wage findings so that it can better protect U.S. workers.¹⁰

3 For all of these reasons, Familias is likely to succeed on its claim that DOL’s
4 acceptance of ESD’s use of the complex capture-recapture analysis is arbitrary and
5 capricious and, because it precludes DOL from protecting prevailing wages, it
6 frustrates the statutory mandate that U.S. wages and working conditions not be
7 adversely affected by the importation of foreign workers and is, therefore, contrary
8 to law.

9
10 This Court should enjoin DOL to instruct ESD that its population estimate
11 methodology is contrary to DOL’s regulations and that ESD must estimate whether
12 there are 5 employer and 30 workers in a crop activity using “sources such as UI
13 databases, open and closed job orders, State labor market information, and
14 information provided by State agricultural extension offices. . .” or other readily
15 available means to make such estimates. 87 Fed. Reg. at 61694.
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21 _____
22 ¹⁰ The Complaint also outlines that ESD’s use of estimated populations later in the prevailing-
23 wage-finding process is contrary to law. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 83-87. This claim is not addressed in this
motion.

1 **C. Plaintiff Familias’s members and Farmworkers Statewide Are Suffering**
2 **and Will Continue to Suffer Irreparable Injury without Emergency**
3 **Relief.**

4 As explained in the fact section, absent injunctive relief, DOL’s unlawful
5 actions will continue to irreparably harm Washington farmworkers, as the workers
6 are deprived of market wages at which workers regularly earn 10% to 40% or more
7 above what they would at the default hourly AEW. *See* Martin Decl. Ex A at 6; *see*
8 *generally* Section II.D, *supra*. Farmworkers have already been injured by DOL’s
9 failure to protect prevailing piece rates during the 2023 harvest season, and 2024
10 harvest season is imminent.¹¹ *See* Pashkowski Decl. ¶¶ 4-5 (214 job orders approved
11 requesting 23,405 H-2A workers for 2024); Ramirez Decl. ¶¶ 19-21. The cherry and
12 strawberry harvests begin in mid-June, with blueberry and blackberry harvests
13 following in July and August, and apple harvest normally beginning in August and
14 continuing into the middle of November. Ramirez Decl. ¶¶ 19-21.

15
16 When wages fall even a few percentage points, farmworker families suffer
17 significant hardship because many already live in or at the edge of poverty. *See*
18 *Torres Hernandez v. Stewart*, No. 1:20-CV-03241-SMJ, 2021 WL 6274440, at *10
19

20
21 ¹¹ There is still time for the Court to protect workers this year because, though all H-2A job orders
22 for June have already been approved, the regulations require employers to adjust their wage
23 payment if prevailing wages change during the pendency of the contract. 20 C.F.R. §
655.120(c)(3).

1 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 1, 2021) (finding irreparable harm from loss of prevailing wages);
2 Ramirez Decl. ¶¶16-18; Fuentes Decl. Ex. 18 at 514-15, 530-32; Ex. 16 at 487, 493-
3 95; Ex. 15; Ex. 17; Ex. 13 at 442-47. DOL’s failure to protect prevailing piece rates
4 will harm Washington harvest workers in another way: the employers that DOL
5 allows to hire foreign workers at the hourly AEWL will report those hourly rates on
6 next year’s survey. The more employers that are certified at hourly wages, the more
7 likely it becomes that next year’s survey will deem hourly wages to be the prevailing
8 wage, not piece rates. Once that happens, other employers will be forced to adopt
9 that method of pay in order to stay competitive with employers relying on foreign
10 workers. Faced with these significant wage cuts, U.S. workers will be driven out of
11 harvest work and replaced by foreign workers or forced to accept lower wages and
12 driven further into poverty.

15 While purely monetary damages typically are generally not considered
16 irreparable, wage depression affects the structure of agricultural occupations and
17 goes far beyond mere monetary injury. Moreover, courts have recognized that even
18 purely monetary injury is irreparable where the plaintiffs are “so poor that [they]
19 would be harmed in the interim by the loss of the monetary benefits.” *Lee v.*
20 *Christian Coal. of Am., Inc.*, 160 F. Supp. 2d 14, 31 (D.D.C. 2001) (quotations and
21 citations omitted); *see also Kildare v. Saenz*, 325 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 2003)
22 (“[E]conomic hardship constitutes irreparable harm”); *United Farm Workers v.*
23

1 *Perdue*, No. 1:20-cv-01452-DAD-JLT, 2020 WL 6318432, at *1-2, 14 (E.D. Cal.
2 Oct. 28, 2020) (finding irreparable harm from 5% wage decrease related to freeze of
3 AEW).
4

5 **D. The Remaining Equitable Factors Favor Granting a Preliminary
6 Injunction.**

7 The remaining equitable factors also favor granting preliminary relief. “There
8 is generally no public interest in the perpetuation of unlawful agency action,”
9 whereas there “is a substantial public interest in having governmental agencies abide
10 by the federal laws that govern their existence and operations.” *League of Women
11 Voters v. Newby*, 838 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (internal citations and quotations
12 omitted). “Depression of local farmworker wages causes the exact harm that
13 Congress sought to prevent in the H-2A program. And the public interest is served
14 by stability in farmworker wages.” *Torres Hernandez*, 2021 WL 6274440, at *11
15 (finding equitable factors favored enjoining 2019 prevailing wage survey). The
16 situation here is indistinguishable from *Torres Hernandez*.
17

18 **E. This Court should not require Familias to post a bond.**

19 The district court has discretion “as to the amount of security required, *if any*”
20 and “may dispense with the filing of a bond when it concludes there is no realistic
21 likelihood of harm to the defendant from enjoining his or her conduct.” *Johnson v.
22 Couturier*, 572 F.3d 1067, 1086 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation and citation omitted).
23 There is no harm to USDOL from enjoining its unlawful action. Moreover, given

1 the finances of the Plaintiff and its farmworker members waiver of a bond is
2 appropriate. *See* Ramirez Decl. ¶¶7-9; *Torres Hernandez*, 2021 WL 6274440, at *12
3 (no bond required in prevailing wage challenge); *Van De Kamp v. Tahoe Reg'l*
4 *Planning Agency*, 766 F.2d 1319, 1325 (9th Cir. 1985); *UFW v. USDOL*, 509 F.
5 Supp. 3d 1225, 1255 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (bond not warranted in granting nationwide
6 injunction preventing freezing of AEW).
7

8 IV. CONCLUSION

9 For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should enter a preliminary
10 injunction requiring DOL to:

11 1. Cease to enforce the “One-Year Rule” and to reinstate and enforce the
12 2020-Survey prevailing wage rates, published in January 2022 (the last prevailing
13 wage rates published in Washington) until judgment is entered in this case;
14

15 2. Cease to enforce the 25% Rule and/or to rescind its approval of ESD’s
16 interpretation of the 25% Rule as requiring *all survey results* to be thrown out if one
17 responding employer accounts for 25% or more of the reported workers paid by the
18 prevailing method of payment;
19

20 3. Rescind its approval of ESD’s use of its complex population estimate
21 methodology and direct ESD to estimate whether there are at least 5 employers and
22 30 workers in a crop activity using readily available sources of information; and,
23

1 4. Prohibit DOL from certifying the importation of foreign workers until
2 its duty to protect U.S. worker wages, particularly prevailing wages, has been carried
3 out.

4 In addition, the Court should enter a scheduling order setting a deadline for
5 DOL to file the administrative record, for Familias to seek additions to that record if
6 necessary, and for summary judgment briefing.

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1 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of May, 2024.

2 We certify that this memorandum contains 8392 words, in compliance with
3 the Local Civil Rules.

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